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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
be able to recoup most of the potential revenue loss that
the Simmers case entails.3 0
It is important to note that the Commissioner has issued
a nonacquiescence to the decision in the Simmers case. 1
However, certiorari was not authorized.2 Treasury Regu-
lation 111, Section 29.23(G-1), promulgated under the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 193983 is still in effect. The Fourth
Circuit taxpayer is in a strong position in relying on the
Simmers case; however, in view of the history of this prob-
lem and the Treasury non-acquiescence to the Tax Court
decision, the taxpayer is not assured that he will be free
from litigation on adopting the Simmers treatment.
RONALD M. SMULLIAN
Forbearance To Sue On An Invalid Claim As
Consideration For A Contract
Fiege v. Boehm1
Plaintiff accused defendant of being the father of her
illegitimate child. To induce plaintiff to forebear bringing
bastardy proceedings, defendant orally promised to pay
plaintiff's medical expenses, loss of wages from her job,
and a fixed sum for the support of the child. After paying
for a short time, defendant had blood tests made which
conclusively showed that he was not the father. Defendant,
therefore, refused to pay plaintiff any further sums. Plain-
tiff subsequently brought bastardy proceedings in the
Criminal Court of Baltimore City. Upon defendant's being
acquitted, plaintiff brought this action for damages in the
Superior Court of Baltimore City alleging breach of the
agreement. That court entered judgment for plaintiff. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that for-
bearance to press a claim that is in fact invalid may still be
consideration for a promise when the claim is made in good
31 Supra, n. 26. Note that in the principal case Simmers had died. There-
fore the basis of the ground rent to his estate was the fair market value
of the asset at the time Of death - §113(a)5 of the 1939 INT. REv. CODE,
26 U. S. C. A. §113 (1955), now §1014 of the 1954 INT. RaV. CODE. In that
event no income would be realized to the estate from the sale or redemption
of the ground rent at Its fair market value, and the appreciation in the
value of the land resulting from the developer's activities would escape
taxation entirely.
1955-2 Cun. Bull. 11.
1956 C. C. H. Vol. 5, 51, 143.
Supra, n. 14.
1210 Md. 352, 123 A. 2d 316 (1956).
[VOL. XVII
FIEGE v. BOEHM
faith and is reasonable. There was no basis in fact for
plaintiff's claim that defendant was the father of the child,
but plaintiff was allowed to recover because at the time of
the making of the contract, both parties believed that a
genuine legal duty on defendant's part to pay plaintiff for
support existed. For recovery on the contract, it was imma-
terial whether defendant was in fact the father of the child.
It can be said the defendant got what he bargained for at
the time of contracting, i.e., freedom from a bastardy pro-
ceeding in exchange for his promise to perform his part
of the contract. I
The Court specifically reaffirmed the Restatement rule2
as the law in Maryland, saying, "[w] e combine the subjec-
tive requisite that the claim be bona fide with the objec-
tive requisite that it must have a reasonable basis of sup-
port".8 This standard for determining when forbearance to
prosecute a claim is consideration for a promise represents
a stand midway between the early common law position
that forbearance to assert a groundless claim could never
be consideration for a promise and the view, taken in a few
jurisdictions, discarding the requirement of reasonableness
and asking only that the claim forborne be one honestly
held and asserted in good faith.4
Assuming that the claim forborne as consideration for
a promise is one held in good faith, the Maryland rule re-
quires a further examination to determine if the claim had
"a reasonable basis of support". Neither courts nor scholars
have been particularly successful in articulating a "test"
of reasonableness to be applied or even in isolating and
describing the factors which prompt them to decide that
a claim is or is not reasonably asserted in a given case.5
1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932), Sec. 76 (b).
'Supra, n. 1, 360.
'A few jurisdictions hold -that the claim must be doubtful in the opinion
of the court, not the individual claimant, e.g., Throckmorton v. Robinson,
83 S. W. 2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Gunning v. Royal, 59 Miss. 45
(1881), possibly overruled by Stanley v. Sumrall, 167 Miss. 714, 147 So. 786
(1933). Others have discarded the reasonableness test entirely and sus-
tain consideration where the claim is honest and bona flde, e.g., B. & W.
Engineering Co. v. Beam, 23 Cal. App. 164, 137 P. 624 (1913) ; Henderson
v. Kendrick, 82 Fla. 110, 89 So. 635 (1921) ; Sherman v. Werby, 280 Mass.
157, 182 N. E. 109 (1932). The remaining view, that of the Maryland
Court and the RESTATEMENT, may be said to represent the weight of
authority, e.g., Taylor v. Weeks, 129 Mich. 233, 88 N. W. 466 (1901) ; In re
Miller's Estate, 279 Pa. 30, 123 A. 646 (1924) ; Simons v. Yoho, 92 W. Va.
703, 115 S. E. 851 (192).
"The claim forborne must be neither absurd in fact from the stand-
point of the reasonable man in the position of the claimant, nor obvi-
ously unfounded in law to one who has an elementary knowledge of
legal principles."
1 WmrSTON ON CoNTRAc s (Rev. Ed., 1936), Sec. 135.
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Reasonableness is rarely a "yes" or "no" proposition.
The quality of any given claim must be evaluated according
to a scale which presumably ranges from clearly reasonable
to clearly unreasonable with all intermediate shades and
degrees. The difficult cases fall near the middle of this scale
in what one court has described as the "'twilight zone' of
doubtfulness".6
Cases in which the alleged consideration for a promise
is forbearance to contest a will perhaps offer the clearest
illustration of a "scale of reasonableness". Approaching
the clearly reasonable end of the scale are the will contest
cases where the caveat is forborne by an heir-at-law, one
who would recover by operation of the laws of intestate
succession if the will were set aside. Cited by the Court
in the Fiege case was the Maryland case of Hartle v. Stahl,7
where heirs-at-law who forbore to contest the will of their
deceased father in exchange for a promise of the adminis-
trator to pay them one thousand dollars were allowed to
recover, it not being necessary that they affirmatively show
they would have succeeded in having the will set aside. The
court there applied only the good faith test, i.e., whether
the parties at the time of contracting believed a bona fide
question was raised. Another case involving a will, cited
by the Court, was Snyder v. Cearfoss, where the Court
cited Hartle v. Stahl and reiterated the test that forbear-
ance to sue is sufficient consideration for a promise to pay
for the forbearance, "if the party forbearing had an honest
intention to prosecute litigation, which is not frivolous,
vexatious or unlawful, and which he believed to be well
founded, even though it may in fact be unfounded". 9 Of
course, the belief in the claim can become more or less rea-
sonable in any given case as additional evidence as to the
age, mental state, etc., of the testator is discovered.
At the clearly unreasonable end of the scale would be a
case where the forbearance of persons, not heirs-at-law, to
contest a will would not be deemed sufficient consideration
for a promise from the named devisee to divide the estate."
A threat by such persons to contest a will where they could
get nothing if the will were set aside, is nonsense.
6Conran v. White & Bollard, 24 Wash. 2d 619, 167 P. 2d 133, 138 (1946).
It was held there that the claimant had not given valid consideration where
he gave up his right of redemption of property bought in at a tax sale,
since such right, which was given by statute had expired.
27 Md. 157 (1867).
S187 Md. 635, 51 A. 2d 264 (1947).9 Ibid, 643.
10 Cf. Bloom v. Bloom, 336 Ill. App. 352, 83 N. E. 2d 619 (1949).
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It is submitted as an hypothesis that in determining
whether a claim asserted in good faith also satisfies the
objective requisite that it must have a reasonable basis of
support, courts are inclined to look at the claim rather than
at the claimant. Granting that the intelligence and knowl-
edge of the claimant will always be material in determining
the good faith of the claimant, the reasonableness of his
belief in the validity of his claim appears to turn principally
on the type and source of the claim itself.
Applying this hypothesis to the whole scale of reason-
ableness and judging the varied cases against it, certain
guides appear. A claim may be said to be reasonably doubt-
ful when the only reliable way of determining its validity
is by actually adjudicating it. This would be true of most
tort claims1 as it is of will contests by heirs-at-law. It
might be said that in these cases there is no scurce of in-
formation as to validity except in the precedents and
equally obscure places. In the Maryland case of Pullman
Co. v. Ray, 2 an employee of the Pullman Company, not
covered by workman's compensation at that time, was in-
jured during the course of his employment. It was said that
he need only have had a reasonable and honest belief in the
possible validity of a claim against the company to support
a promise of lifelong employment in exchange for foregoing
his common law right to sue.
But, where there is some identifiable source of the claim
which can be examined by the prospective claimant,
which is usually a written source, the claim will not be
reasonably doubtful unless the claimant can show that his
claim was reasonably asserted under or in the terms of the
writing. He must further show that he was reasonably in-
telligent in reading and interpreting the writing. In
DiPaula v. Green" and Strohecker v. Schumacher, etc.,'4
for example, the stricter standard was applied. In the
Dipaula case, the claimant was a materialman who alleged
that the owner of a building had promised to pay what the
builder owed him if the claimant forbore to attach a ma-
terialman's lien on the building. The affixing of the lien
"1Plunkett v. O'Conner, 162 Misc. 839, 295 N. Y. S. 492 (1937), where the
plaintiff's wife was negligently injured by the defendant's son on a bicycle.
Although the plaintiff's claim was unfounded in law, it was asserted in
good faith; therefore, the Court held that a promise to forbear to bring a
suit was good consideration for the defendant's promise to pay, since there
was a bona fide dispute between the parties at the time of contracting, and
the campromise should be enforced in the absence of fraud.
201 Md. 268, 94 A. 2d 266 (1953).
18 116 Md. 491, 82 A. 205 (1911).
"185 Md. 144, 43 A. 2d 208 (1945).
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was controlled by statute, and the claimant clearly did not
come within its provisions. 5 The Court held that since no
lien could legally attach, the promise to forbear from doing
something the claimant had no legal right to do was not
sufficient consideration for the owner's promise to pay. In
the more recent Strohecker case, the Court quoted from
the Dipaula case, saying, "[w] here no lien could legally be
filed, abstention from the attempt was not a good considera-
tion for a personal promise".' It is interesting to note that
this case and the Snyder" case were decided within two
years of each other, suggesting that the Court does apply a
different standard for forbearance of a common law action,
e.g., contesting of a will by the heirs-at-law, as opposed to
the standard applied when the right of action can arise only
by being within the confines of a writing. Similar results
have been reached in cases where the claim was based upon
such identifiable sources as statute,' insurance policy, 19
or contract.
20
In cases upholding the sufficiency of consideration of a
forbearance to sue if the statute upon which the unpursued
claim was based appears ambiguous on its face,2 or is one
which had not been authoritatively construed at the time of
I Md. Code (1904), Art. 63, Sec. 1.
11 Supra, n. 14, 151.
"1 Supra, n. 8.
1 Tozier v. Woodworth, 135 Me. 46, 1.88 A. 771 (1936), tax collection war-
rant had expired; Hooff v. Paine, 172 Va. 481, 2 S. E. 2d 313 (1939), ma-
terialman's lien, criticized in 26 Va. L. Rev. 121 (1939).
'Soevyn v. Ruhl, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 771 (1951), where husband's father
failed to allege that he had -any right to the proceeds of an insurance
policy on the lives of husband and wife who died in the same fire, the
forbearance to press such a claim was not consideration for the promise
of the wife's mother to share said proceeds with the husband's father.
'OZanphir v. Bonnie Meadows, Inc., 127 N. Y. S. 2d 269 (1953), where
there was a claim based on a contract made at the same time a deed was
passed, forbearance to sue on such a contract was not sufficient considera-
tion to support a promise to do an act, since the contract was merged In
the deed. The Court said, at 271, that it would be unreasonable to hold, in
the face of the escrow agreement which was to survive the deed's delivery,
that the plaintiff had any right to sue on the original contract, or even
reasonably believed that he had any such right. But, see Melotte v. Tucei,
319 Mass. 490, 66 N. U. 2d 357 (1946), where an additional agreement was
entered into before the plaintiff would agree to buy the defendant's house.
Held, that the plaintiff had surrendered his right to litigate his contentions
based on the defendant's promise to do an act. This was forbearance to
press a claim made in good faith, not frivolous, or vexatious, and was there-
fore valid consideration.
2 1Ruckel v. Baston, 252 S. W. 2d 432 (Ky., 1952), where a statute that
controlled the case was vague in its application, therefore the plaintiff and
the defendant, by making their agreement, traded possibility for actuality.
A compromise was struck between the parties when their rights under the




making the agreement to forbear,22 there is little question
that the claim is "doubtful", that surrender of the right to
assert it is sufficient consideration. The claim surrendered
in the instant case meets this characterization. The right
to bring bastardy proceedings is conferred by statute,28
there being no common law paternal obligation to support
illegitimate children. But the statute does not state who
shall have the right to bring the action, primarily because
such a proceeding is a criminal action brought by the state.
As well as failing to define or limit the class of persons who
may commence such proceedings, it does not specify any
type, quality, or amount of evidence necessary to the suc-
cessful prosecution of the case. The principles applicable
to this statute are the same as those imposed upon the
naturally ambiguous or unconstrued enactments.
J. M. ROULHAC
The Basis Of Title By Adverse Possession
Sterling v. Sterling'
In March or April of 1935, Jake Sterling erected a crab-
bing shanty on pilings in the navigable waters of Ape's
Hole Creek. He made the shanty generally available, and
many of the watermen used it for the purpose of shucking
oysters, dumping the shells over into the creek. Through
the depositing of these oyster shells an artificially formed
island began to appear in November or December of 1935,
and had developed into a formation of substantial propor-
tions. On April 29, 1955, the State of Maryland issued a
patent to the said island to Guy Sterling, who, on May 16,
1955, brought suit in equity to enjoin Jake from trespassing
on the island and to remove the buildings and floats which
he had constructed thereon. Jake answered that he had
gained title to the island by adverse possession. On appeal
from a dismissal of the bill by the Circuit Court for Somer-
set County, the Court of Appeals reversed.
As pointed out by the Court, the land above water aspect
of the case was conclusively governed by Article 57, Sec-
tion 10 of the 1951 Code, which provides that:
United States v. American Trading Co. of San Francisco, 138 F. Supp.
536 (D. C. N. D. Cal., 1956).
"Md. Code (1951), Art. 12, Sec. 2.
211 Md. 493, 128 A. 2d 277 (1957).
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